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CONCEPT PAPER

CYPRESS FUND
FOR PEACE & SECURITY

Introduction

The post-9/11 world is not safe. The long-understood dangers of the Cold War world have melted into a more complex reality, in which secretive terror cells rattle the foundations of democratic societies and instill fear into uneasy populaces. Our understanding of a world run by states is complicated by growing networks of powerful groups operating outside the reach of any particular government. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons technology has spread far beyond the control of international treaty structures, into the realm of terrorist networks and unstable or threatening regimes. On a regional level, societies trapped in failed states or corrupt authoritarian regimes spawn disenfranchised citizens, bitter intergroup and political rivalries, and cultures of violence.

A definition of safety for the 21st century would encompass these daunting realities, to include new conceptions of peacebuilding and non-proliferation focused on preventing conflict in an unstable world. Innovative, practical, initiatives drawing upon multi-disciplinary learning, reach beyond the boundaries of traditional peacemaking and security to create pockets of safety. For example:

- An American research institution works with Indian and Pakistani scientists to safeguard nuclear weapons and components;
- A Ugandan aid agency provides night-time havens for children threatened by the Lord's Resistance Army;
- Democracy advocates in South America, Africa and Asia band together to form stronger democratic institutions and civil society networks in their regions;
- Environmental advocates in the Russian Far East work to resist degradation of the region's vast natural resources, and to create civil society networks to counter powerful government and corporate encroachment on land use.
- A non-governmental health organization provides vaccinations and safety for citizens of Mozambique.

These activities, carried out by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are aimed at keeping the world safe in large and small ways. These NGOs, and others like them, mediate between citizens and governments, to change societies and deflate violence in unstable areas of the world. Their work at the intersections of conflict resolution, democracy building, security, development and rule of law helps create pockets of safety, creativity, new ideas and social networks that can prevail against dangerous forces of violence, dictatorship, anarchy, and terrorism.

The philanthropy world has abandoned much of its work in the areas of conflict resolution and nuclear proliferation over the past five years, notwithstanding widespread public concern for these issues (especially in the wake of 9/11). For example:

- Since 2000, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Starr Foundation, and the Merck Foundation, all major donors, have left the field of nuclear non-proliferation.
- The Hewlett Foundation, a major funder of arms control and conflict resolution initiatives since 1987, will close its program at the end of 2004. This is a major blow to the field, since the Foundation gave out between $11 and $25 million per year to conflict resolution groups over the past five years alone, and provided the funds that helped create the field's academic and organizational infrastructure.
- The Soros Foundation has pulled out of its work on conflict resolution and civil society building in Central and Eastern Europe, to focus on advocacy issues in Washington, D.C.
- The Carnegie Corporation has decided to focus more narrowly on proliferation, giving up its programs on conflict resolution, human security and sovereignty.
- The MacArthur Foundation has a small human rights program and a larger initiative focusing on science and technology issues, but the Foundation is far from a sustaining force for organizations working on issues of non-proliferation and conflict resolution.
- The Winston Foundation a great supporter of new ideas in both peacebuilding and non-proliferation, closed its doors in 1988.

NGOs operating at the intersection of a number of disciplines suffer disproportionately as foundations narrow their scopes and pull back from troubled areas of the world. At a time when creative, tailored philanthropy could foster great change in the world (for example, the Land Mines Coalition created a large and powerful network on a shoestring budget), major foundations have pulled back.

The Cypress Fund is a new foundation, seeking to increase safety and stability in a turbulent world. By giving sustained support to NGOs operating at key intersections of peace and safety in a global context, we seek to create and share knowledge about new methods of peacemaking, nonproliferation, and safe societies in the post 9/11 era. Ultimately, we hope to support those groups building safe havens for the world community in the 21st century and beyond.

How Do We Achieve Safety?

We base our efforts to make the world safer on eight core beliefs:

1. Without safety there cannot be security; without security there cannot be peace.
2. Individual security, including the freedom to pursue one's life ambitions in a climate free from tyranny, disease, intergroup violence, and nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, lies at the heart of peaceful societies.
3. On the global level, safety involves freedom from the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical weapons. Locally, safety involves freedom from "machine gun" cultures and continual, destabilizing violence. Little has been done about the global avalanche of small arms, destabilizing governments around the world, particularly in Africa and Latin America.
4. Proliferation of nuclear materials and chemical/biological weapons technology now means that the question is "when" not "if" a nuclear or chem/bio incident will take place. New means for halting the proliferation of nuclear materials, along with disincentives for using nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, must displace the outmoded Cold War system.
5. Peaceful societies, with citizens free from fear, who are therefore able to hope and dream, are less likely to support or harbor terrorists.
6. Stabilizing societies involves strengthening the links between democracy, development, conflict resolution and peacemaking, human rights, and health.
7. In a time when conflict prevention is cast in negative terms such as "early warning" and crisis intervention, we need positive models for "early hope" and deeper, more structural conflict prevention. Preventing conflict is ultimately more productive than responding to conflict in a crisis situation.
8. NGOs that work in these fields are not being supported on the kind of sustained basis necessary for them to plan and to be effective.

While one foundation cannot solve the world's problems, the Cypress Fund can make a significant difference by giving resources to key organizations that can bridge fields and operate within existing and new political structures, to create lasting structures for stability and peace, on a local and global level.

Theories of Change

Every Foundation must have a vision of how its work will create change in the world. These "theories of change" underlie every program, grant decision, and evaluation procedure. Several theories of change will guide the work of the Cypress Fund.

1) Safer World

After the fall of the Soviet Union, public perceptions of the dangers of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction changed dramatically. Once the superpower rivalry crumbled, the public no longer viewed nuclear annihilation as a potential threat. Innovative programs to safeguard fissile material in former Soviet stockpiles went largely unreported in the news, and proliferation by new powers (India and Pakistan), after the initial shock, failed to raise a high degree of international outrage or action.

Public awareness revived after September 11, when the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons falling into the hands of terrorists became frighteningly clear. At the same time, the taboo against usage of nuclear weapons seemed to lift slightly, as Pentagon planners sought to test "bunker buster" and other tactical nuclear weapons.

We now face a dangerous and amorphous climate of weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation of nuclear technology continues, as illustrated by Pakistan's export of nuclear technology; North Korea's continuing development of nuclear weapons; Brazil's recent fracas with the IAEA; and Iran's far-from-secret nuclear weapons program. Frequent reports of the scientific expertise of Al Qaeda operatives lead to speculation about biological or chemical weapons attacks.

The international treaty regime threatens to unravel in the changing landscape of weapons of mass destruction. New programs are desperately needed to link counterterrorism with efforts to stem proliferation of WMD. This is possible only by holding governments accountable to current treaties, and encouraging NGOs to help bridge the gaps between governmental and non-governmental groups working on new approaches to proliferation.

Supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime and its underlying bargains is key to stemming the flow of weapons of mass destruction.

Recent years have witnessed severe setbacks for the NPT Regime as well as some successes. The 1995 Statement of Principles, the basis of NPT Parties' assent to a permanent NPT, remains largely unfulfilled. The same situation holds for the additional steps to strengthen the NPT agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, which unexpectedly ended on a positive note. Without a strong treaty mechanism in place, governments cannot be held accountable for testing, developing, and using weapons of mass destruction. Examples of the erosion of the treaty regime include:

1. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), pursuant to the 1995 Statement, was to be completed within one year. It was indeed signed in 1996, but it still has not entered into force, largely as a result of its rejection by the U.S. Senate in 1999. And discussion continues in the United States about the possible resumption of nuclear weapon testing.
2. An agreement on making legally binding the 1995 Negative Security Assurances (by which the NPT nuclear weapon states undertook not to attack NPT non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons) remains out of reach and the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia retain national policies inconsistent with the 1995 Assurances, which were essential to NPT extension.
3. The NPT nuclear weapon states signed the supporting protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, but the U.S. has not ratified any of these protocols.
4. The nuclear weapon reduction process has been virtually terminated. The START negotiations no longer exist and the 2002 U.S.-Russia Treaty calls only for the removal of a number of strategic offensive arms from operational status in the next decade.
5. The 1995 call for strengthened NPT verification led to the 1997 Additional Protocol. To date, however, fewer than 20 percent of NPT Parties have adopted it (Iran is an important new party, and the U.S. Senate has recently ratified it.).
6. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference declared in its Final Document, agreed to by all the NPT Parties, declared the ABM Treaty to be the "cornerstone" of strategic stability. The treaty has been terminated.
7. In 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted nuclear weapon test series and declared themselves to be nuclear weapon states. Pakistan, as exemplified by the A.Q. Khan network, remains a dangerous nuclear proliferation threat.
8. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in early 2003 and claims to have built several nuclear weapons. Intelligence estimates currently have North Korea at six to eight weapons. Japan has asserted privately that when they became a NPT non-nuclear weapon state, they agreed to five nuclear weapon states, not seven (not counting Israel) and if there is to be an eighth named North Korea, there will be a ninth named Japan. If Japan were to become a nuclear weapon state, South Korea might not be far behind and this likely would spell the end of the NPT. And if the NPT does begin to unravel, it will become more and more difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations.

The stark truth has emerged that as long as nuclear weapons retain the high political value that they had all through the Cold War and to the present, countries will want to possess them. If the NPT nuclear weapon states, most importantly the U.S., are going to follow policies with respect to NPT non-nuclear weapon states of "we may have nuclear weapons, but you may not," the inevitable eventual reaction will be "those that can, will." For this reason it is vital to implement the 1995 Statement of Principles and the 2000 Review

Conference additional measures. As the arms control regime that has kept proliferation at bay for fifty years continues to erode, it is imperative to find new ways to strengthen treaty obligations, to create new incentives against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to build public/private partnerships to keep nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorist organizations.

Grass roots efforts against proliferation can help change attitudes and norms about the use of weapons of mass destruction. NGOs leading these efforts must be able to play both the public game to influence public attitudes, and also, perhaps more importantly, the "inside" game to quietly influence governments, abroad and in the United States.

NGOs working in the area of proliferation must work both in the area of public opinion, and in the quiet corridors of power. Since weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear materials, are generally under the control of government, NGOs need to be able to talk with, educate, and learn from government officials. At the same time, they need to keep a higher profile with the general public, working to influence public opinion and educate citizens about the dangers of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In playing this dual role, NGOs can help bridge the gap between policy and public opinion and can bring about significant change.

Examples of these public/private interactions include:

- The Lawyers' Alliance for World Security talks with NATO, regarding a No First Use policy for NATO's nuclear doctrine;
- The work of the Center for Defense Information in public distribution of policy analysis on security and proliferation;
- The program of the Nuclear Threat Initiative to buy Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Belgrade, when the State Department did not have the funds to do so;
- The lobbying activities of the Council for a Livable World, working with legislators on issues of nuclear proliferation, and educating the public on these issues.

The Cypress Fund will provide key resources to NGOs capable of making governments conform to their obligations under the NPT, and that are also able to work with scientists, policy analysts, activists, the development world, and other organizations to create public awareness, develop new programs, and push for enlightened policy that will leave the world less vulnerable to the terrorist use of horrific weapons of mass destruction.

2) Safer Societies

New visions of safety and security require unprecedented cooperation between groups working on conflict prevention, public health, democracy, security, and civil society development.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1987, new lenses have influenced the way we see safety and security. While nation states traditionally have formed the main units of security, the focus has shifted to the rights of individuals[1]. We now look not only at whether a particular country is likely to go to war, but also at the literal and figurative health of its individual citizens: what is the climate of human rights in the country? Are citizens free to pursue education and economic advancement? Does a free press allow for broad expression of political views? Is public health robust enough to allow a new generation to thrive? Are citizens free to connect with their own governments? How do global scourges such as the drug trade, small arms traffic, and terrorism affect particular citizens? How are citizens drawn into or impacted by civil, regional, or global conflict?

Hand in hand with this focus on the individual comes a focus on what creates a society in which citizens can flourish, and conflict can be resolved using political, rather than violent, means. A broad consensus has emerged, in both the conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding communities, about what factors help create safe societies. Each of these factors is necessary, but not sufficient in itself, for creating a society in which citizens can pursue full lives and individual potential in an atmosphere of peace. The challenges are greater in "failed states" (in which no central government is accountable) and in authoritarian regimes, so these societies are in greater need of international help and foundation assistance.

The elements leading to safer societies consist of democracy (or at least a few robust democratic institutions); civil society organizations (an informal infrastructure acting as a buffer between the government and its citizens – what de Tocqueville deemed to be the great strength of American democracy); a strong framework of human rights and rule of law; security mechanisms; adequate public health; healthy development and economic security; and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Democratic Participation and Open Societies: Countries in which citizens have avenues for participation and free expression, if not full democracy, are better able to channel conflict into political action, rather than resorting to violence. A country does not need to be a highly advanced democracy in order to allow its citizens forums for participation and expression. A non-corrupt, transparent judicial system; venues for public debate on societal issues such as health and education; a free press – strengthening any one of these areas can help a society develop a political culture in which fuller democracy can eventually take hold and in which grievances can be aired and addressed without violence. The key is finding organizations that allow some "breathing room" in which these institutions can begin to take root, and which encourage public dialogue on issues key to the society's future.

Human Rights/Rule of Law: Human rights and rule of law issues dovetail with conflict resolution and democracy issues. In a society that threatening to spiral into deadly violence, human rights abuses can serve as a harbinger for future violence. During a conflict, human rights groups can shine a spotlight on military abuses and work to uphold international standards of warfare. In the post-conflict period, human rights groups can work toward developing systems of memory and justice (e.g. truth and reconciliation commissions), and can work with democracy advocates to build stronger state and civil society institutions.

Conflict Resolution: Conflict resolution provides tools for preventing conflict (for example, dialogue and problem solving processes); helps shape and facilitate public dialogue on important social issues; and helps the healing process after conflict. Conflict resolution includes processes such as mediation (either on a diplomatic or a citizen level), negotiation, early intervention, and facilitation of difficult public conversations. Conflict resolution can act both as a catalyst for cooperation, and as a bridge between the other sectors necessary for safe societies.

Development/Economic: Security Economic opportunity and development can prevent conflict, and can protect against the sort of anomie that leads to terrorism, religious extremism, and suicide bombing. Whether basic assistance – such as food aid – or more sophisticated economic and health programs, development helps build stronger societies in which citizens have freedom of choice in their economic futures, and a guarantee of at least basic needs.

[1] This new lens is often called "human" or "individual" security, as opposed to the neo-realist, realpolitik models in which nations are considered monolithic actors, making choices about war and peace based on rational interests of the state itself.

Public Health: Programs focusing on public health – especially those dealing with the AIDS pandemic – help guard the social infrastructure of fragile societies. In societies in which a third of the working population succumbs to AIDS, children are left vulnerable, economic activity grinds to a halt, and the stage is set for anarchy. Well-tailored public health programs can help shore up the societal infrastructure of these fragile societies, and keep all sectors of the society economically and politically active. The public health sector can also play an important role in the post-conflict society, healing war-related trauma.

Strong Civil Society Structures: Strong civil society structures are key supports for democracy; act as agents for dialogue on key social issues; and help empower the voices of citizens. They serve as a buffer between government and its citizens, funneling information from the government level to the citizenry, and from citizens to government. Recent studies have suggested that societies with strong civil society organizations are less inclined to violence based ethnic, religious, or other intergroup lines (e.g. between Muslims and Hindus in parts of India that have strong civil society networks

Security: Without basic security, peacemaking and safety are impossible. A strong, but responsive police force; a military that protects citizens while respecting their human rights; and firm government control of autonomous militias are basic requirements for citizens' safety. There is a very fine balance, however, between robust security measures and authoritarian control of citizens' lives. The proper balance is critical to a perception of safety in all senses of the word.

While these elements are all necessary for creating safe societies, none is sufficient in itself Bosnia, for example, has security in place from IFOR troops, but lacks a democratic system free from ethnic politics. Burundi has a wide network of civil society groups

working for peace and safety, but security is lax, and ethnic massacres frequently erupt. The most important and creative work that NGOs can do in such fragile societies is to link the elements together. For example, programs that work simultaneously on building democracy and civil society; that link security and human rights; or that incorporate conflict resolution into development plans, play a critical bridging and catalytic role during times of intense social change.

The Cypress Fund seeks to fund NGOs working at the intersections of these elements, helping to create new models for change in unsafe societies. These NGOs often "fall between the cracks" of other foundations, whose program areas are so narrowly focused that interdisciplinary activities fail to meet the standards of particular grant programs. By focusing on these hybrid organizations, and helping disseminate the results of their work, the Cypress Fund hopes to develop new models for safety and peace in the post 9/11 world.

Supporting groups working at the intersection of democracy building, civil society building, human rights, development and health can have strong ripple effects throughout a society, creating change much larger than their own individual efforts.

We believe that NGOs with hybrid agendas can best act as catalysts for change and safety in fragile, unsafe societies. They can galvanize public support, mobilize different communities within their societies, negotiate with government policymakers, seek international knowledge and attention from many fields, and provide models for change in other societies. Leaders of hybrid groups often think more creatively, draw on wider resources, and respond more proactively to change than do groups fixed within a singular, fixed focus. Furthermore, in order to attain the stable economic development, freedom from ravaging diseases, robust physical infrastructure (including water), and access to education that lead to less violent societies, leaders and citizens must learn how to use public participation and dialogue for the resolution of large-scale social problems and the creation of blueprints for social change. NGOs can play a powerful role in instigating and facilitating the dialogue needed for this kind of social change.

3) The Role of the Cypress Fund in Social Change

Grantmaking must serve an educational and informational purpose

One of the primary weaknesses in peacebuilding philanthropy to date has been the "bottlenecking" of information from and about new and innovative grants. Often, best practices, lessons learned, failures, and new opportunities find their way into grant reports that are disseminated only as far as a program officer's file cabinet. One of the Cypress Fund's primary goals will be to disseminate the lessons learned from each of our grants, and to provide a forum for learning, education, research and discussion about the new models that our grantees are developing. We hope to create a wider knowledge base for innovative peacemaking, non-proliferation and the creation of safe havens throughout the world, with clear guidelines about how models might work across cultural, political, and geographical divides.

NGOs committed to the fields of arms limitation, non-proliferation and conflict prevention, must have regular support in order to build sufficient staying power to help move the United States and the world community effectively in the direction of peace, stability and security in the 21st century.

Short funding duration plagues NGOs working in the fields of peacebuilding and nonproliferation. Many foundations offer only project grants, with little or no funds devoted to organizational overhead. Furthermore, these grants usually have a short cycle – one to two years at most – with no predictability as to renewal. This "short leash" makes it nearly impossible for organizations to conduct wise strategic planning, especially when many must bend their agendas to fit increasingly narrow funding criteria from foundations. To make matters worse, foundations almost never collaborate on grantmaking, so that organizations must spend significant amounts of time preparing reports for multiple donors. We believe that organizations need consistent, multi-year support in order to conduct the long, dedicated work of security and peacebuilding. By offering institutional support (with yearly reports and frequent conversations) over a longer period of time than most foundations (five year increments when the situation allows; shorter "seed grants," which might lead to longer grants when appropriate), we hope to foster the organizational health of our grantees. We hope this support would also mean that NGOs could devote energy that might otherwise go into writing grant proposals to creating and disseminating knowledge to the larger security and peacebuilding communities.

Strategies for Implementation

The Cypress Fund, while primarily a grant-making foundation, will also have operational impact. We plan to make grants, as outlined below, to NGOs that are on the cutting edge of safety, peacebuilding and non-proliferation. We will favor interdisciplinary approaches that blend work in the public and private sectors. In addition, we will serve as a catalyst for knowledge building, by taking an active role in developing, distilling and disseminating new theory, discoveries, techniques, models, and best practices. When partnerships between organizations would be useful, we would encourage joint grantmaking. If we feel that we need more knowledge or information about a particular area, we would hire consultants or seek guidance from academics or experts to help us plan more effective grant-making (we might even create small programs on the ground in strategic areas that are lacking infrastructure in our main areas of interest). The main implementation strategies will aim for flexibility, transparency, and sustained support for NGOs.

In the first several years, we are unlikely to accept unsolicited proposals. We wish to explore the landscape of potential grantees, and would then invite proposals from groups we believe would best fit with the agenda and resources of the Foundation.

Specific strategies will include:

- **Using regional review boards to help identify potential grantees**

  While we are acquainted with many organizations around the world working on issues of safety, we cannot be familiar with the vast landscape of small and large organizations working in areas related to proliferation, peacebuilding, and safe societies. We plan to develop regional "boards," made up of experts from the geographical regions, or substantive areas, in which we will be working. These boards will highlight potential grantees, help review proposals, and work with us on evaluating and monitoring grants.

- **Using foundation funds to disseminate grant results, hold annual conferences among grantees, and issue reports to policy makers and NGOs working on issues of peace and safety.**

  Often, the only people (if any) to read about the progress of a grantee's work are the grantee and the program officer reading the annual report. The Cypress Fund will promote grantees' sharing of knowledge, insights, and expertise, and will publish the results of these meetings when appropriate. Reports to policy makers and NGO leaders will include new data, policy analysis, and lessons learned from multi-disciplinary grants. We will publish those reports in a serious and organized way, not simply as part of a "feel-good" quarterly newsletter.

- Making a top priority the development of theory, best practices, and new understanding about safety and security in the post-9/11 world.

  One of the top priorities of the Foundation will be knowledge building. To shape a new vision of world safety, we need to help develop better theory and lenses for analyzing and resolving conflict. We want to learn how work in one context might apply to similar conflicts or problems in other parts of the world. We want to support innovative programs whose premises and results can be replicated elsewhere, without rigid limits of geography or subject areas that would limit broad experimentation. Whether by supporting academic programs, or by connecting NGOs with appropriate academic institutions, we want to find creative ways for better understanding the challenges of safety and security in the post-9/11 world.

- Starting with microgrants, then, as the foundation expands, adding levels of institutional support to grantees, and supporting university and think tank research

  If the foundation starts with a low endowment, our grants will be limited to microgrants and perhaps seed funding for specific projects. We hope, as the foundation grows, to offer institutional support to NGOs whose work embodies the goals of the foundation. Institutional support allows for more consistent strategic planning, greater integrity of mission (since organizations are not scrambling to mold their activities to funders' expectations), and "surge capacity" to explore new areas. We also hope to support academic work in theory building, which demands considerably more resources than micro-grants can provide.

- Most importantly, becoming a reliable supporter of effective NGOs and related institutions within the limits of the resources of the Foundation.

  Finally, whether we are funding micro-grants or institutional support, we want to be consistent, reliable funders. We want to make multi-year grants that are readily renewable from year to year if the work continues on track. We want to act as strategic partners with our grantees, helping them grow as they pursue their missions. While we expect to have robust reporting and evaluation requirements, we want to make our processes as flexible and sensible as possible for our grantees. So often, NGOs scramble from one short-term project to another; we hope to be able to make longer-term commitments that will help both the foundation and the grantee use the relationship to the best advantage.

Building the Organization

Creating the Foundation

- We became a Washington, DC corporation on March 16, 2005, and we received our 501(c)(3) designation from the IRS in October 2005. We have retained Covington & Burling, a law firm based in Washington, DC, to advise us in all the legal aspects of building the foundation.
- We held our organizational board meeting on April 7, 2005, and held subsequent board meetings on November 8, 2005 and April 11, 2006.
- We are currently renting office space at 1601 Dupont Circle, in Washington, DC, in order to be close to the non-proliferation and peacebuilding communities with whom we will be creating partnerships.

Building the Board

We have created a small, working board as the organization begins operation. We will expand the board as our activities and fundraising progress. The following people currently serve on the Cypress Fund's executive board:

- Ambassador Thomas Graham (board chair)
- Melanie Greenberg (ex officio)
- Jan Eliasson, United Nations Envoy for Dafur; former Foreign Minister of Sweden and President, UN General Assembly
- Rosemarie Forsythe, Manager, International Political Strategy, Exxon Mobil Corporation
- Katherine Hope Gurun, Mediator with JAMS; former Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Bechtel Corporation
- David Hamburg, DeWitt Wallace Distinguished Scholar, Weill Medical College, and president *emeritus* of the Carnegie Corporation
- David Holloway, Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, Stanford University
- Eliza Klose, founder and former president of ISAR: Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia
- Nancy Lampton, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, American Life and Accident Insurance Company of Kentucky, Inc.
- Nancy Lindborg, President, Mercy Corps
- Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize winning author of *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*

We plan to draw from the academic world, the corporate community, and the substantive fields of non-proliferation and peacebuilding for the remaining slots. We will stress an international vision in the board's composition.

The following people have agreed to serve on the Advisory Board of the Cypress Fund:

- **Hrach Gregorian,** President of the Institute for World Affairs
- **Johanna Mendelson-Forman,** United Nations Foundation
- **B. Stephen Toben,** President, Flora Family Foundation
- **Professor Christopher D. Jones** (The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, at the University of Washington).

Staffing

- Initially, the staffing will consist of Melanie Greenberg, as president, and an assistant who will manage the administrative needs of the organization (with expertise in grants administration).
- Eventually, we hope to hire a substantive program officer, as well.
- We will outsource the investment of our endowment, our legal services, our accounting oversight, and our computer needs

Funding Levels:

In the immediate future, we are focusing on fundraising and bringing resources into the foundation that we can immediately turn around into grants. In the early years, we plan to make grants in the order of $300,000 - $500,000 per year, even if it means the slower development of a potential endowment. Eventually, we hope to build an endowment in the area of $20 million that would translate into $1 million to $1.2

Biographies of Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. and Melanie Greenberg

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. (Chairman)

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. is special counsel in the Energy Practice of the law firm of Morgan Lewis, resident in the Washington, D.C. office. Ambassador Graham participates in the International Energy and Department of Energy practice areas.

Internationally known as a leading authority in the field of arms control agreements to combat the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, Ambassador Graham has served as a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the negotiation of every major international arms control and non-proliferation agreement for the past 30 years, including The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) Treaties, The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaties, The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Ambassador Graham also currently serves as the Chairman of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security. From 1994 until 1997, he served as the Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament, appointed by President Clinton. He served for 15 years as the General Counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

He has also served as the Acting Director and Acting Deputy Director of ACDA, as Legal Advisor to the U.S. SALT II, START I and START II Delegations, the Senior Arms Control Agency Representative to the U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Delegations, and many others. In addition, Ambassador Graham led U.S. Government efforts to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994 and 1995.

Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of The Chemical Weapon Convention and The Biological Weapons Convention. He drafted the implementing legislation and managed the ratification of the Geneva Protocol banning the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

Ambassador Graham is also a widely published author in both scholarly journals and major newspapers. He is the author of *Disarmament Sketches, Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law, 2002 (a memoir)* ; *Cornerstones of Security, Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era, 2003*, with Damien J. Lavera (existing treaties with comments); *Common Sense on Weapons of Mass Destruction,* September, 2004-all published by the University of Washington Press. Recent articles include: "National Self Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in the *University of Chicago Law School Journal of International Law*, Spring, 2003; and "An NPT for Non-members," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May/June, 2004 (with Avner Cohen). He has taught at many prestigious universities, including the University of Virginia School of Law, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, the Georgetown

University Law Center, Stanford University, and the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. Ambassador Graham received a L.L.B. from Harvard University in 1961 and an A.B. from Princeton in 1955. He is a member of the Kentucky, District of Columbia, and New York bars and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He chaired the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the American Bar Association from 1986-1994. Ambassador Graham received the Trainor Award for Distinction in Diplomacy from Georgetown University in 1995.

Melanie Greenberg (President)

In addition to creating the Cypress Fund, Melanie Greenberg was until September 2004 a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, focusing on issues of justice in post-conflict peacebuilding. From 2000 – 2002, Ms. Greenberg was director of the Conflict Resolution grantmaking program at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Prior to joining the Hewlett Foundation, Ms. Greenberg served as the associate director of the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, and deputy director of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation. In her work on international conflict resolution, Ms. Greenberg has helped design and facilitate public peace processes in the Middle East and the Caucasus. She has taught courses in international conflict resolution, multi-party conflict resolution and negotiation at Stanford Law School and Georgetown University Law Center, and she was lead editor and chapter author of the volume Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). Ms. Greenberg until recently served as board chair of the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and sits on the board of directors of Women in International Security, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, and Partners for Democratic Change. She is a member of the Council of Advisors for the United States Institute of Peace, and serves on the editorial board of Dispute Resolution Magazine. She is a member of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide. Ms. Greenberg holds an AB magna cum laude from Harvard, and a JD from Stanford Law School. She lives in Washington, DC with her husband and two children.

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